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Has the EMU Reduced Wage Growth 
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By using a model of trade union behaviour Grüner (2010) argues that the introduction of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) led to lower wage growth and lower unemployment in 
participating countries. Following Grüner’s model, monetary centralization lets the central 
bank react less flexibly to national business cycle movements. This increases the amplitude of 
national business cycles which, in turn, leads to higher unemployment risk. In order to 
counter-balance this effect, trade unions lower their claims for wage mark-ups resulting in 
lower wage growth and lower unemployment. This paper uses macroeconomic data on OECD 
countries and a difference-in-differences approach to empirically test the implications of this 
model. Although we come up with some weak evidence for increased business cycle 
amplitudes within the EMU, we neither find a significant general effect of the EMU on wage 
growth nor on unemployment. 
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1. Introduction 
Although in existence for more than a decade, it is still not clear what the macroeconomic 
consequences are of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Grüner (2010) has recently 
presented a theoretical model in which he argues that the introduction of a monetary union 
leads to structurally lower unemployment, wage growth and inflation rates. In a nutshell, by 
introducing a monetary union, monetary policy will be less equipped to deal with country-
specific business cycle movements and hence will react less to those. This increases the risk 
of (risk-averse) trade union members to become unemployed in case of excessive wage 
demand. Hence, because country-specific business cycle volatility will increase, trade unions 
will restrain their wage demand which ultimately leads to a lower level of both inflation and 
unemployment in the participating countries.
1  
This paper puts the empirical implications of this model to the test. We use a difference-in-
differences approach, i.e., we examine the change in different volatility measures, wage 
growth and unemployment for EMU member countries after the introduction of the euro, 
using several other industrialised countries as control group. According to the literature, 
difference-in-differences is an effective way to trace the economic consequences of “natural 
experiments”, like in our case the introduction of EMU (see for instance Imbens and 
Wooldridge, 2009). To the best of our knowledge, it has not been used to study the 
macroeconomic effects of the EMU so far. In particular, the approach allows us to control for 
permanent differences between EMU and non-EMU members as well as economic trends 
over time which are unrelated to the introduction of the euro. By this we can also prevent 
problems of endogeneity, for instance the possibility that only countries with relatively low 
unemployment rates adopted the euro. Although we come up with some weak evidence for 
increased business cycle volatility within the EMU, we neither find any significant effect of 
the EMU on wage growth nor on unemployment as suggested by Grüner (2010).  
There exists a large body of research dealing with the economic effects of the EMU. 
Mongelli and Vega (2006) provide a general overview including literature on the effects of 
the EMU on trade, business cycle synchronization, risk sharing, specialization, financial 
                                                 
1 In fact, the introduction of a monetary union acts very similar to increasing the degree of central bank 
conservatism: both lead to less accommodative monetary policy, at least at the national level. 3 
 
markets, product and labour market reforms, and inflation. Baldwin (2006) surveys the 
literature on the impact of the EMU on international trade. Beetsma and Giuliodori (2009) 
provide an overview of the literature on macroeconomic consequences of the EMU with a 
focus on institutional and politico-economic aspects.  
Quite a number of papers focus on the labour market effects of the EMU. On the theoretical 
side, Grüner and Hefeker (1999) and Cukierman and Lippi (2001) argue that EMU might 
lead to higher nominal wages, unemployment and inflation in EMU member countries. The 
intuitive reason in both papers is that a centralization of monetary policy increases the 
number of trade unions vis-à-vis the central bank. Consequently, the central bank reacts less 
to national or sector-specific wage increases which induces trade unions to act more 
aggressively.
2 Following Jensen (1993) monetary policy cooperation may increase nominal 
wages, inflation and decrease employment when the national economies are subject to 
symmetric shocks. The reason is that inflation becomes more uncertain in a cooperative 
setting as compared to a non-cooperative setting. This induces trade unions to claim higher 
wages.  
Posen and Popov Gould (2006) investigate the impact of EMU on wages empirically and find 
that the EMU has not led to more aggressive wage setting. Rather, EMU has strengthened 
wage restraint. However, there set-up does not allow them to conclude to what extent the 
observed behaviour of wages was peculiar to member states of the euro area or rather a 
manifestation of a more general trend common to all industrial countries.  
Several papers deal with the impact of the EMU on labour market reforms. For instance, 
according to Sibert and Sutherland (2000) monetary centralization increases the incentive to 
make labour markets more flexible and to reform factors which affect the inflation bias if 
macroeconomic shocks are uncorrelated across countries or the number of member countries 
in the monetary union is large because in this case the central bank is less able to stabilize 
shocks. In contrast, if the opposite holds true then a decentralized monetary policy may 
produce more reform since countries aim at protecting themselves from others’ beggar-thy-
neighbour policies. Consequently, a common monetary policy may produce more inflation 
                                                 
2 For further work on these and other aspects of (de)centralization of wage setting see Calmfors and Driffill 
(1988), Danthine and Hunt (1994), and Iverson and Soskice (2000). 4 
 
than a decentralized setting.
3 On the empirical side, Duval and Elmeskov (2006) investigate 
whether the introduction of the EMU fosters or hinders product and labour market reform and 
observe a slowdown in EMU member countries’ reform intensity after the introduction of the 
EMU.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theoretical 
argument made by Grüner (2010) in more detail and formulates the hypotheses which we can 
test. Section 3 describes our data set and discusses the methodology used. Section 4 presents 
our empirical results, while Section 5 presents a number of robustness checks. The final 
section offers concluding comments.  
2. Grüner’s model of trade union behaviour 
During the run up to the euro several papers were published dealing with its potential 
consequences. Amongst those, papers by Grüner and Hefeker (1999) and Cukierman and 
Lippi (2001) argued that the EMU would increase inflation and unemployment. In that line of 
work it was argued that introducing a monetary union would lead monetary policy to react 
less to country-specific business cycle and wage developments. By assuming that trade 
unions are not concerned with increased business cycle volatility, higher wage mark-ups 
would result. Consequently, the monetary union would face higher inflation and 
unemployment rates. 
According to Grüner (2010, p. 1), the “EMU is by and large a success story and it performed 
much better than many economists predicted”; therefore Grüner challenges his own previous 
position by remodelling in particular trade union behaviour. Trade unions are dominated by 
risk-averse workers that not only care about their wages, but also about keeping their jobs. 
Higher business cycle volatility increases the risk of getting fired. To reduce this risk, trade 
unions restrain their wage demand and in this insider-outsider model thereby lower the 
natural rate of unemployment.  
As any theory, also this model of trade union behaviour rests on several assumptions. For 
example, only due to at least some degree of risk aversion of trade union members, the 
increased employment volatility due to membership in a monetary union leads to subdued 
                                                 
3 See also Calmfors (2001) who analyzes several possible ways by which the EMU may affect the probability of 
labour market reform, wage flexibility and unemployment. 5 
 
wage demand of the trade unions. In our view, the assumption that trade union members are 
on average risk averse appears reasonable.  
The line of arguments also needs that negative macroeconomic shocks create unemployment 
risk. Indeed (and as we will show), there is an empirically robust negative relationship 
between basically any measure of economic activity and the unemployment rate. It appears 
more than reasonble that this implies that the subjective risk of trade union members to lose 
their jobs also increases in a downturn. Similarly, we follow mainstream economic theory 
and take the assumption that wage restraint will lower unemployment risk for granted.
4  
The assumed consequences of centralisation of monetary policy for national business cycle 
developments are crucial. It is required that economic conditions are not the same and 
national business cycles are not fully synchronised within the monetary union. Although it is 
difficult to assess to what extent this holds, it is safe to say that we do not live in a fully 
synchronised world. Furthermore, when moving away from nationally defined monetary 
policy towards monetary policy centralised at the level of the monetary union, countries 
become less flexible to react to nation-specific economic developments. Consequently, as 
compared to a situation without centralised monetary policy, this amplifies business cycles, 
i.e., increases the volatility in economic activity measures.
5 Within our difference-in-
differences approach we will empirically test this hypothesis.
6  
                                                 
4 To be more precise, for Grüner’s argument to hold it is sufficient that members of trade unions believe wage 
restraint decreases unemployment risk. 
5 It is implicitly assumed that central banks are actually capable of influencing business cycles as intended. In 
fact, central bank policy might erroneously increase economic volatility instead of dampening it. Hence, it might 
be that by centralising monetary policy, i.e., tying the hands of central bankers, such errors are circumvented. 
We stick to the more traditional view of Grüner (2010), in the sense that monetary policy has in the recent 
decades been well capable of reducing business cycle volatility. 
6 Increased national cycles also imply that overall business cycle synchronisation is reduced in a monetary 
union. Hence, although favourable for the EMU in other dimensions, this model challenges the idea of the euro 
area being a self-fulfilling optimal currency area. Indeed, business cycles across the euro area do not appear to 
have become more synchronised over time. De Haan, Inklaar and Jong-A-Pin (2008) deliver a detailed survey of 
empirical research on business cycle synchronisation. See, e.g., Sturm and Wollmershäuser (2008) and EEAG 
(2007, 2009) for recent empirical analyses of the business cycle synchronisation in the EMU from a monetary 
policy perspective.  6 
 
According to Grüner (2010), the above implies that trade unions claim lower wage mark-ups 
in a monetary union than under a national currency setting. Consequently, relative to non-
members, wage growth is lower for EMU member countries.
7 This will be the next 
hypothesis we put to the test. 
Finally, we will empirically investigate the consequences for unemployment. According to 
the model, reduced wage growth will lead to lower unemployment in member countries as 
compared to non-member countries. 
3. The Data and empirical strategy 
To test the hypotheses, we use macroeconomic data on up to 22 industrialised OECD 
countries.
8 All data collected stem from either the OECD Main Economic Indicators or the 
OECD Economic Outlook, are on a quarterly frequency and have been seasonally adjusted. 
We allow the data to go back to 1984 and end shortly before the outbreak of the world 
economic crisis, i.e., the second quarter of 2008. In this way, the sample on the one hand 
covers a set of relatively homogeneous countries during a relatively stable period and on the 
other hand leaves enough variation to produce meaningful results. Furthermore, it more or 
less equally divides up the sample into a group of EMU member and non-member countries 
and into an EMU and pre-EMU period.  
The set of variables selected can be split into labour productivity, three economic activity 
variables and two price variables. The economic activity variables are GDP, industrial 
production and the standardised unemployment rate as published by the OECD.
9 The price 
                                                 
7 One might also argue that the increased risk of becoming unemployed results in trade unions allowing for 
more flexible wage settings, i.e., wages that react more flexibly to macroeconomic shocks. If that would be the 
case, wage volatility should increase after the introduction of the monetary union. See also Sibert and 
Sutherland (2000) and Calmfors (2001) on monetary policy centralization and labour market or wage flexibility. 
8 The following countries are included: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
9 Unfortunately, the use of a fourth measure of economic activity, the output gap as taken from OECD (see 
Giorno et al. 1995) comes at the cost of a severe reduction in the number of countries in our sample. That is why 
we abstain from reporting regression results including this variable. This notwithstanding, our general results do 
not change when using the output gap as measure of economic activity.  7 
 
variables are consumer price inflation (as measured by the percentage change in the 
harmonised consumer price index) and growth in the gross wage rate in the manufacturing 
sector.
10 Unfortunately, not all countries publish all variables and the starting date of 
publication varies substantially. As a consequence, the actual sample size varies across the 
regressions.  
Our empirical testing strategy rests on difference-in-differences approaches. Since the 
seminal work by Ashenfelter (1978) and Ashenfelter and Card (1985), the use of difference-
in-differences methods has become widespread in empirical economics (Imbens and 
Wooldridge 2009).
11 The basic principle of such approaches is to compare changes in a 
treatment group, EMU countries, to those in a control group, non-EMU countries, and 
therefore it appears particularly well suited to the problem at hand.
12  
In the empirical part we will use three closely related set-ups. The first one puts the simplest 
setting possible in which outcomes of the introduction of the euro are observed in one of two 
groups and in one of two time periods into a panel data framework. In the first period, which 
will be the average over the 1984-1998 period, no country is exposed to the euro. In the 
second period, i.e., in general 1999-2008, we observe the same countries again.
13 Those in the 
treatment group become EMU members in that period, whereas the others stay out and 
therefore represent the control group.  
We use this set-up with using only two cross sections of information on the same set of 
countries in particular when analysing the consequences of the EMU on volatility. The 
treatment effect is now calculated as the average change in volatility over time in the control 
group subtracted from the volatility change in the treatment group. This double differencing 
                                                 
10 Some countries publish industrial production, unemployment rate and gross wage rate data on a monthly 
frequency. In those cases we take quarterly averages. 
11 See for example Meyer (1995), Angrist and Krueger (1999), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), Angrist and 
Pischke (2009) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for overviews and textbook discussions of difference-in-
differences methods.  
12 In recent literature the issue of inference within such approaches is being discussed (see, e.g., Bertrand et al. 
2004, Hansen 2007a, 2007b, and Donald and Lang 2007).  
13 Within our sample, only Greece enters the EMU at a different date, i.e., 2001. Hence, for Greece the sample 
split occurs at this date. 8 
 
removes biases in second period comparisons between the treatment and control group that 
are the result of permanent differences between those groups, as well as biases resulting of 
time trends unrelated to the treatment (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009).  
This treatment effect equals c in Equation (1) and can be directly estimated using OLS. 
(1)  Δyi = yi2 – yi1 = a + c·Gi + ui, 
where yit is the variable of interest observed for countries i=1,…,I in periods t=1,2. G is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if a country belongs to the treatment group, i.e., will become 
an EMU member, and ui represents the usual residual which is assumed to be independent 
and identically distributed. One of the advantages of using a regression framework is that it 
allows us to include additional variables to control for differences across the treatment and 
control groups. 
The second set-up stays within the two-period, two-group panel data framework but exploits 
the specific features of the panel data further by assuming unconfoundedness given lagged 
outcomes: 
(2)  Δyi = yi2 – yi1 = a + c·Gi + d·yi1 + vi. 
As noted by, e.g., Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), this approach is quite different from the 
previous one as it uses different assumptions with respect to the residual term. On the one 
hand, Equation (2) allows a free coefficient on the lagged outcome, which makes it more 
flexible than Equation (1). On the other hand, however, it needs the assumption that yi1 is 
uncorrelated with the residual term. This makes it difficult to directly compare the two 
approaches.  
The final set-up moves away from a two-period set-up and exploits the full information 
available in the time dimension of our data. As this is not feasible when using our volatility 
measures – which are by construction only available for two periods – this approach is used 
when exploring the effect of the EMU on wage and unemployment developments. The basic 
equation becomes: 
(3)  Δyit = ai + bt + c·Pt·Gi + d·yi,t-1 + eit, 
where Pt is a dummy variable which equals 1 for the EMU period and 0 otherwise. The time 
subscript now runs from 1984 until 2008, i.e., t = 1984q1,…,2008q2. The main advantage of 
this specification is that it allows us to include country-specific effects, ai, to control for time-9 
 
invariant structural and institutional differences across countries.
14 Furthermore, and in line 
with the arguments of Grüner (2010), we remove the international business cycle by 
including period dummies, bt.
15 Moreover, in all three approaches it is straightforward to 
include additional control variables. Standard economic theory suggests including the 
inflation rate and measures of economic activity to control for the business cycle. Finally, we 
cluster standard errors for each country separately across time periods in order to account for 
country-specific serial correlation. Hence, we assume that observations are independent 
across countries but not necessarily within countries. Admittedly, one may doubt whether 
cross-country independence is really in place in our sample. However, we stick to this 
assumption because it is in favour of Grüner’s theory: the EMU introduces a common shock 
to EMU member countries; allowing for cross-section dependence would just drive the EMU 
group effect down.  
Albeit being appropriate from an econometric point of view, the difference-in-differences set-
ups in which additional controls are added in a somewhat ad hoc manner may not sufficiently 
reflect theories on the determinants of wage growth. For that reason, we also estimate a more 
theory-driven wage equation placed within difference-in-differences set-ups. In this we rely 
on Blanchard and Katz (1999). Based upon both efficiency wage theory and wage-bargaining 
models, they derive a wage Phillips-curve specification that is in line with empirically well-
established relationships. Following Blanchard and Katz (1999, p.70) “[m]ost efficiency or 
bargaining models deliver a wage relation that can be represented (under some simplifying 
                                                 
14 Nickell (1981) has shown that the application of ordinary least squares to dynamic panel data models with 
fixed effects such as Equation (3) results in biased coefficient estimates, where the bias is of order O(1/T). This 
is especially problematic for panel data settings with a high number of cross sectional units N and a limited 
number of time periods T. If, however, the number of time periods in the panel increases, the bias becomes less 
and less severe. With T = 98, as in our basic setting, the bias is small. We therefore refrain from approaches 
which aim at correcting for the Nickell bias, such as difference and system generalized method of moments 
estimators (see, for instance, Arellano and Bover, 1995, and Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
15 Note that the country- and period-specific effects (ai and bt) make the inclusion of separate treatment and 
EMU-period dummies (Gi and Pt) superfluous. Only a dummy capturing the non-aligned entry of Greece into 
the EMU (in 2001) is needed. Although for the sake of brevity we have not included it in the equations in this 
section, the Greece-dummy is present in the regressions. 10 
 




t) = μ·rt + (1–μ)·lt + β·ut + εt, 
where wt is the nominal wage rate, p
e
t is the expected price level, rt is the reservation wage, lt 
stands for labour productivity, ut is the unemployment rate (all in logarithmic form) and εt is 
the usual error term. Furthermore, Blanchard and Katz argue that the reservation wage is 
likely to be determined by both productivity (lt) and lagged real wages (wt-1–pt-1) and assume 
the following relationship (cf. ibid. p.70): 
(5)  rt = α – λ·(wt-1–pt-1) + (1–λ)·lt. 
Substituting Equation (5) into the wage Equation (4) and rearranging yields (cf. ibid. p.71):  
(6) (wt–wt-1) = μ·α + (p
e
t–pt-1) – (1–μλ)·(wt-1–pt-1–lt-1) + (1–μλ)·(lt–lt-1) – β·ut + εt. 
The term (wt-1,i–pt-1,i–lt-1,i) can be seen as an error correction term capturing the past strength 
of labour unions. If, for instance, real wages in the past have outpaced labour productivity, 
then this will dampen current wage developments. Equations along these lines have been 
estimated for various OECD countries by a number of researchers.
16 
To translate this equation into our difference-in-differences set-up, we follow two different 
strategies. In the first, we stick as closely as possible to the approach of Imbens and 
Wooldridge (2009). We fit the time-series setting of Blanchard and Katz into our panel set-up 
by adding a cross-section dimension to Equation (6). Then, we set the term yi,t-1 in Equation 
(3) equal to lagged nominal wage growth, (wi,t-1–wi,t-2), and accordingly replace yi,t-1  in 
Equation (3) by the right hand side of the one period lag of Equation (6). After rearranging, 
assuming rational expectations and relaxing some coefficient restrictions, we obtain: 
(7)  Δ(wit–wi,t-1) = ai + bt + c·Pt·Gi + d1·(pi,t-1–pi,t-2) + d2·(wi,t-2–pi,t-2–li,t-2) + d3·(li,t-1–li,t-2) +   
d4·ui,t-1 + fit. 
                                                 
16 See, for instance, OECD (1997). 11 
 
The second strategy is to directly add our EMU dummy (Pt·Gi) and country- (ai) and year-
fixed (bt) effects to Equation (6). After rearranging and relaxing some constraints this results 
into:
17 
(8) (wt–wt-1) = ai + bt + c·Pt·Gi + d1·(pit–pi,t-1) + d2·(wi,t-1–pi,t-1–li,t-1) + d3·(lit–li,t-1) + d4·ui,t 
+ git. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Did the EMU amplify business cycles? 
Grüner (2010) argues that EMU leads to an increase in the amplitude of national business 
cycles or in the volatility of economic activity (see Section 2). We test this hypothesis by 
employing the first and second set-up of the previous section. Our volatility measures consist 
of standard deviations of GDP growth, growth in industrial production, and the 
unemployment rate in the pre- and post-EMU periods.  
Table 1 displays the regressions results. Although the coefficient estimates on the EMU 
group dummy all have the predicted positive sign, most of them are not statistically 
significant. Concentrating on the first set-up, i.e., looking at the odd columns, reveals that 
volatility in any of our real activity measures has decreased across the two time periods: the 
estimated constants are all significantly negative. Those countries that introduced the euro 
have witnessed on average a smaller decrease in these volatility measures, albeit in none of 
the regressions this difference is statistically significant.  
Turning to our second set-up, i.e., the even columns, does not fundamentally change the 
picture. For GDP growth and the unemployment rate, we observe mean reversion, i.e., those 
countries experiencing high (low) volatility in the earlier period see a reduction (increase) 
thereof in the second period. Volatility with respect to industrial production growth appears 
much more persistent. Again EMU countries underwent a higher level of volatility during the 
                                                 
17 Note that, when coefficient d in Equation (3) is negative (due to mean reversion, for instance), the coefficients 
of inflation, the error correction term, labour productivity growth and unemployment will switch signs when 
comparing Equations (7) and (8). For instance, whereas d1 in Equation (7) equals –d·(1–μλ), it equals –(1–μλ) in 
Equation (8). 12 
 
second period. This time this effect is only statistically significant in case of the 
unemployment rate.
18,19 
Hence, overall we find some weak evidence in favour of Grüner’s hypothesis: the EMU has 
led to a relative increase in business cycle volatility. As overall volatility has decreased, the 
EMU has acted against a general trend towards moderation of business cycles. This finding is 
supported by various robustness tests which we summarize in the appendix. Given the chosen 
set-ups and the consequently limited degrees of freedom, we certainly do not want to 
overemphasize these empirical results.
20 
4.2 Did the EMU decrease wage growth? 
As discussed above, according to Grüner (2010) the introduction of the EMU has led to a 
decrease in nominal wage growth in member countries.
21 We test this proposition by first 
employing the same set-ups as before. However, to fully exploit the information contained in 
the time series dimension of the data, to correct for structural differences across countries and 
to capture the world business cycle, we will subsequently implement the third set-up as 
described by Equation (3) above. Furthermore, in order to control for price and economic 
activity effects, we include consumer price inflation as well as either the unemployment rate 
or industrial production growth in our regressions.
22 Moreover, we control for labour 
productivity growth. 
                                                 
18 We further modified the set-up by including the country-specific means of the variables underlying the 
respective volatility measure over the pre-EMU period into the regressions. This did not change the results in 
any notable way (results are available upon request). 
19 In line with Grüner’s argument all our volatility measures are real figures. In addition, we tested for the 
impact of EMU on the volatility of inflation but did not find any significant effect.  
20 Furthermore, one may argue that for Grüner’s theory to hold, increased business cycle volatility is neither 
necessary nor sufficient. Instead, it is necessary that trade unions believe that EMU membership has increased 
the amplitude of national business cycles. 
21 According to Grüner (2010) it is foremost nominal wage growth which declines. Although in his line of 
arguing average inflation is lower in a monetary union, this is not sufficient to prevent real wage growth from 
falling as well. 
22 We concentrate on unemployment and industrial production growth, as these account for either the wage 
Phillips curve relationship or adjusts more quickly to economic shocks and focuses clearly on the manufacturing 13 
 
The first four columns of Table 2 compare average annual nominal wage growth in the 
manufacturing sector across the two periods we consider, i.e. 1984 to 1998 versus 1999 until 
the second quarter of 2008.
23 Column (1) estimates Equation (1) and thereby summarizes the 
data: on average annual nominal wage growth decreased by 1.23 percent across these two 
periods. For EMU countries an additional average decrease of 0.04 percent is observed. 
However, this difference between EMU and non-EMU countries is statistically insignificant. 
The subsequent three columns add additional explanatory variables to this equation (and 
thereby alter the assumptions with respect to the residuals). There are clear signs of mean 
reversion. Those countries that experienced relatively high (low) wage growth during the first 
period see their wage growth decline (increase) after introduction of the euro. Furthermore, in 
column (4), lagged industrial production growth is a significant explanatory variable of 
changes in nominal wage growth in the manufacturing sector across countries. Although 
compared to column (1) this more elaborate model has a substantially better fit, our 
conclusion is not changed. There does not appear to be a significant difference between non-
EMU and EMU countries with respect to nominal wage growth and in column (4) even the 
sign of the coefficient of interest is not in line with Grüner’s hypothesis. 
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 present the results when using our third set-up and hence 
move from a cross-country to a within panel regression. Despite the different angle and the 
higher degrees of freedom, the conclusions are not affected by this. Inflation and different 
measures of economic activity can explain a significant part of the within variation in the 
data. Higher inflation and/or economic activity results in stronger wage growth. However, 
labour productivity growth cannot significantly explain changes in wage growth. Also, the 
EMU dummy remains insignificant at conventional significance levels. 
Column (7) of Table 2 implements the model in the spirit of Blanchard and Katz presented in 
Equation (7) of Section 3, while column (9) presents its version as outlined in Equation (8) of 
Section 3. In both regressions the coefficient of the EMU difference-in-differences dummy is 
clearly insignificant. Consumer price inflation remains significant at conventional levels. The 
fact that the consumer price coefficient is negative in column (7) whereas it is positive in 
                                                                                                                                                        
sector, respectively. We also used GDP growth as an alternative measure for economic activity. The results 
remain basically unchanged.  
23 The sample split differs for Greece as it only entered the EMU in 2001. 14 
 
column (9) matches our expectation: in the presence of mean reversion (which is certainly the 
case in all our wage regressions), the inflation coefficient will switch signs when moving 
from Equation (7) to Equation (8).
24 Consequently, both columns indicate that higher 
inflation leads to higher nominal wage growth.  
Labour productivity growth is insignificant in both column (7) and (9). Whereas the 
unemployment rate is also insignificant in column (7), it differs from zero at the 1 percent 
level and has the expected negative sign in column (9). Finally, the error correction term is 
negative and significant in column (7), but insignificant in column (9). When we substitute 
unemployment by alternative measures for economic activity – i.e. industrial production or 
GDP growth – the results remain basically unchanged (see column (8) and column (10) of 
Table 2 for industrial production growth).To sum up, our empirical analysis has not been able 
to find clear support for Grüner’s hypothesis that wage growth has declined due to the EMU. 
As we show in the appendix, this finding is robust to a multiplicity of further tests. 
4.3 Did the EMU decrease unemployment? 
Following Grüner (2010), the introduction of EMU leads to a decrease in wage growth which 
subsequently leads to a reduction in unemployment (see Section 2). Hence, a further test of 
Grüner’s theory will be to examine whether the introduction of the EMU has led to a decrease 
in unemployment in EMU member countries. Just as in the previous section, we include 
consumer price inflation, labour productivity and industrial production or GDP growth.  
In accordance with the previous section, the first four columns of Table 3 compare the 
average annual unemployment rate in the second period to that of the first period. Column (1) 
implements the first set-up of Section 3. The constant lacks significance at conventional 
levels. Hence, on average there is no significant difference in unemployment across the two 
periods. Column (2) applies the second set-up of Section 2, and column (3) adds additional 
explanatory variables to this set-up. Just as for wage growth, there are clear signs of mean 
reversion. Those countries that experienced relatively high (low) unemployment rates during 
the first period see their unemployment rates decline (increase) after introducing the euro. 
Furthermore, whereas inflation does not significantly impact unemployment, labour 
productivity and industrial production growth do: the lower the former or the higher the latter 
                                                 
24 See footnote 17. 15 
 
variable in the pre-EMU period, the stronger unemployment declines across the two periods. 
Importantly, none of the three regressions shows a significant decrease of unemployment 
related to the introduction of the EMU. As shown in column (4), replacing industrial 
production growth by GDP growth leaves the insignificance of the EMU difference-in-
differences variable unchanged. This alternative measure, however, is insignificant by itself. 
Columns (5) and (6) implement the third set-up of Section 3, i.e., the set-up that exploits the 
full information available in the time dimension of our data. Inflation turns out to be positive 
and significant at the 10 percent level in column (5) but insignificant in column (6). As one 
would expect from Okun’s Law, industrial production growth and GDP growth are 
significantly negative, suggesting that the stronger economic performance the lower is 
unemployment. Albeit negative, the EMU difference-in-differences dummy variable is 
insignificant in both columns.
  
To conclude, as in the preceding section, we do not find support for Grüner’s theory. This 
finding is confirmed by a multitude of robustness tests which we summarize in the appendix.  
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper has examined the effect of the introduction of the euro on a number of 
macroeconomic variables in the EMU countries using difference-in-differences approaches 
with several non-participating industrialised countries as control group. The three hypotheses 
tested stem from a recent model on trade union behaviour by Grüner (2010). According to 
that model the introduction of the EMU lets monetary policy react less flexibly to national 
business cycle movements. The latter increases the amplitude of national business cycles. In 
order to counterbalance the thereby increased unemployment risks, trade unions lower their 
claims for wage mark-ups resulting in lower wage growth and lower unemployment.  
We apply several versions of the difference-in-differences approach using macroeconomic 
data on up to 22 OECD countries from the early 1980s onwards. Two set-ups summarize the 
data into two periods – a pre- and post EMU period. Although this reduces the degree of 
freedom substantially, it allows us to test for increased business cycle volatility induced by 
the EMU. In the third difference-in-differences set-up, we explore the within panel dimension 
of our dataset and use quarterly information. Moreover, we estimate a more theory-driven 
wage Phillips-curve specification following Blanchard and Katz (1999) which we integrate in 
two different ways into our difference-in-differences set-up.  16 
 
Although we come up with some weak evidence for an increased business cycle amplitude 
within the EMU, we neither find any significant effect of the EMU on wage growth nor on 
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Appendix 
We carried out a multitude of robustness checks for each of the three hypotheses derived 
from Grüner (2010) and tested in Section 4. This appendix summarizes these robustness tests. 
As regards the hypothesis that the EMU has led to an increase in the amplitude of national 
business cycles or in the volatility of economic activity (see Section 4.1), we have 
implemented three robustness checks. First, we extended the sample to the latest available 
date, i.e. the last quarter of 2010 and thereby included the financial crisis period. Second, we 
re-ran our regressions excluding the run-up period to the EMU, i.e., 1992-1998 during which 
countries might have behaved differently to warrant entry to the EMU. Third, we excluded 
Denmark and Sweden from our sample and thereby from the control group; in these two 
countries referenda stopped entry into the EMU.  
Given that we have three different robustness checks, three alternative measures of business 
cycle volatility (standard deviations of either GDP growth, industrial production growth, or 
the unemployment rate) and two alternative model set-ups (see set-up (1) and (2) in Section 
3), we ran 18 robustness regressions in this case. In all except one of these regressions, the 
EMU difference-in-differences dummy is positive. However, in only 6 cases this relationship 
is statistically significant. Hence, these results are broadly consistent with our baseline 
results: there is some weak evidence in favour of Grüner’s hypothesis that the EMU has led 
to a relative increase in business cycle volatility. 
As regards the central hypothesis that the introduction of the EMU has led to a decrease in 
nominal wage growth we applied a multitude of robustness tests. First, we repeated our 
analyses using alternative samples:  
a) A sample that allows the number of quarters to be equal before and after the introduction 
of the euro: 1989q3–2008q2;
  
b) A sample that starts as early as possible: 1970q1–2008q2;
25  
c) A sample that includes the financial crisis period: 1984q1–2010q3, 
d) A sample excluding the run-up period to the EMU: 1984q1–1991q4, 1999q1–2008q2;  
                                                 
25 The downside of this sample is that it is highly unbalanced. 21 
 
e) – g) Samples excluding Denmark or Sweden, or both: 1984q1–2008q2.  
In this way, we ran a total of 35 cross-section wage regressions (7 different samples times 2 
different difference-in-differences set-ups of which one is altered by employing 3 alternative 
proxies for economic performance as part of the additional control variables or no additional 
control variables at all). Moreover, we ran 63 panel wage regressions (7 different samples 
times 3 different empirical models
26 times 3 different proxies for economic performance). In 
none of the regressions the EMU difference-in-differences dummy variable showed up 
significant.  
Second, in order to control for possible effects of adjustment and reform policies to meet the 
Euro convergence criteria, we included a second difference-in-differences set-up for the 
Maastricht-to-EMU period into our wage regressions. In none of our 9 regressions (3 
different empirical models times 3 different proxies for economic performance), neither the 
Maastricht 1992 difference-in-differences dummy variable nor the EMU 1999 difference-in-
differences dummy variable turned out to be significantly positive.  
Third, we re-ran the panel set-up (3) presented in Section 3 with all control variables in first 
lags. In none of these regressions the EMU difference-in-differences dummy variable was 
significant.  
Possibly, consumer price inflation, labour productivity and economic performance affect 
wage growth differently for non-EMU and EMU countries before and after introduction of 
the EMU. Hence, as a fourth robustness check we re-ran set-up (3) including interaction 
effects between the EMU group dummy and inflation, labour productivity or economic 
performance. In all cases, neither the EMU group dummy variable itself nor the interaction 
effects with inflation and economic performance showed up significant.  
Fifth, we employed the panel set-up (3) where we interacted the EMU difference-in-
differences dummy variable (and its individual components) with a dummy variable for large 
countries.
27 There is no evidence that EMU had a different impact on wage growth in large 
countries compared to small countries.  
                                                 
26 Equations (3), (7) and (8) of Section 3.  
27 As large countries we define Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom and the 
USA. 22 
 
Sixth, we implemented panel set-up (3) where we excluded either all Southern EMU 
countries in our sample (Italy, Portugal, Spain) or all Northern EMU countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands). The EMU 
difference-in-differences dummy variable is insignificant in the regressions excluding the 
Southern EMU countries and it is marginally significant and negative in the regressions 
excluding the Northern EMU countries. Grüner argues that his theory rather applies to the 
high-wage countries, and not as much to the “Southern Med” countries. Hence, these results 
rather contradict than support Grüner’s theory.  
Finally, we employed the difference-in-differences panel set-up (3) where only one EMU 
country is included at a time. In other words, the control group consists of all non-EMU 
countries as before, whereas the treatment group consists of only one country at a time. For 
Germany the EMU difference-in-differences dummy variable is clearly insignificant at 
conventional levels for all three alternative measure of economic performance. For Austria, it 
showed up significantly negative for two out of the three measures of economic performance. 
In contrast, for France, the EMU dummy variable turned out significantly positive at 
conventional levels for all alternative measures of economic performance. For Spain, the 
EMU dummy is significantly negative only in the unemployment regression, whereas it is 
significantly positive for Finland and Ireland in the industrial production regression and 
significantly positive for Luxemburg in the unemployment regression. For all other countries 
the EMU difference-in-differences dummy variable remains insignificant. To sum up, 
whereas for most cases we do not find any significant effect of EMU on wage growth, for 
some regressions we find a significantly negative effect and for some others we find a 
significantly positive effect. Hence, the robustness tests confirm our basic finding that it is 
not possible to in general establish a significantly negative effect of the EMU on wage 
growth as hypothesized by Grüner’s model. 
Regarding the hypothesis that the introduction of the euro leads to a reduction in 
unemployment in EMU member countries we also come up with a multitude of robustness 
tests analogous to our robustness tests for the wage growth hypothesis. First, we repeated 
what we did in Section 4.3 based on the seven alternative samples presented above. In none 
of 28 cross-section regressions the EMU difference-in-differences dummy variable is 
significantly negative. Only in 1 out of 14 panel regressions, the EMU difference-in-23 
 
differences dummy variable shows up significantly negative, whereas it is insignificant in all 
other regressions.
28  
Second, as for wage growth we included a second difference-in-differences set-up for the 
Maastricht-to-EMU period into our unemployment regressions. In neither of the two 
regressions (using our two different proxies for economic performance: industrial production 
and GDP growth), the EMU dummy turned out to be significant. In contrast, the Maastricht 
(1992) difference-in-differences dummy showed up significantly positive in the regression 
including industrial production growth. This result may be explained by increased reform 
efforts prior to EMU accession which resulted in higher unemployment. However, the 
Maastricht dummy is insignificant in the regressions including GDP growth.  
Third, we re-ran the panel set-up (3) presented in Section 3 with all control variables in first 
lags. In none of the regressions the EMU difference-in-differences dummy variable is 
significant. 
Fourth, we re-ran set-up (3) including interaction effects between the EMU difference-in-
differences dummy and inflation, labour productivity or economic performance. Throughout 
all regressions neither the EMU dummy variable nor its interaction effects are significant at 
conventional levels.  
Fifth, we employed the panel set-up (3) where we interacted the EMU difference-in-
differences dummy variable (and its individual components) with a dummy variable for large 
countries. In the regression including industrial production growth the interaction effect 
between EMU and the large country dummy is negatively significant, whereas the EMU 
dummy itself is not significant at conventional levels. In the other regressions neither the 
EMU dummy nor its interaction effect is significant at conventional levels.  
Sixth, we implemented panel set-up (3) where we excluded either all Southern EMU 
countries in our sample (Italy, Portugal, Spain) or all Northern EMU countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands). The EMU 
difference-in-differences dummy variable is insignificant in the regressions excluding the 
Southern EMU countries. In contrast it is significantly negative at the 5 percent level in the 
                                                 
28 To be more specific, it is negatively significant in the regression including GDP growth based on the sample 
dating from the first quarter of 1984 to the third quarter of 2010. 24 
 
GDP growth regression excluding the Northern EMU countries. As argued above these 
results rather contradict than support Grüner’s theory.  
Finally, we again employed the difference-in-differences panel set-up (3) where only one 
EMU country is included at a time. For Finland, France and Italy (Portugal), the EMU 
difference-in-differences dummy variable is now significantly negative at the 1 percent level 
(10 percent level) independent of the measure of economic performance. For Belgium (the 
Netherlands, Austria), it showed up significantly negative at the 1 percent level in the 
industrial production growth regression (GDP growth regression, GDP growth regression) 
only. In contrast for Ireland (Luxembourg), the EMU dummy is significantly positive at the 1 
percent (10 percent) level in the industrial growth regression. In all other regression, the 
EMU difference-in-differences dummy variable is insignificant. To sum up, for some 
regressions we do not find any significant effect of EMU on unemployment, for some others 
we find a significantly negative effect and again for some others we find a significantly 
positive effect. Hence, the robustness tests confirm our basic finding that it is not possible to 
in general establish a significantly negative effect of the EMU on unemployment as 




Table 1: Did the EMU amplify business cycles? 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EMU group (G) 0.00462 0.00201 0.00282 0.00283 0.192 0.295**
(1.340) (1.183) (0.663) (0.648) (0.415) (2.142)
Lagged Std. -0.847*** 0.0121 -0.957***
(-7.740) (0.0586) (-14.06)
Constant -0.00756*** 0.00978*** -0.00876** -0.00926 -0.876** 0.640***
(-3.103) (3.863) (-2.789) (-1.017) (-2.503) (4.279)
No. Countries 20 20 22 22 21 21
  of which EMU 10 10 12 12 12 12
R-squared 0.091 0.799 0.021 0.022 0.009 0.917
ΔStd.(GDP growth) ΔStd.(IP growth) ΔStd.(Unempl.rate)
 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 26 
 
Table 2: Did the EMU decrease wage growth? 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
EMU (G or P ·G) -0.000432 -0.000795 -0.0000411 0.00312 -0.000675 -0.000968 0.000412 0.000295 -0.00340 -0.00310
(-0.079) (-0.20) (-0.0074) (0.74) (-0.57) (-0.83) (0.52) (0.35) (-1.00) (-0.98)
Lagged wage growth -0.562*** -0.846*** -0.694*** -0.334*** -0.324***
(-4.01) (-3.94) (-4.16) (-7.50) (-7.44)
Consumer price inflation
# 0.285 0.277 0.113** 0.122** -0.0397* -0.0367** 0.363*** 0.427***
(1.12) (1.31) (2.30) (2.40) (-2.09) (-2.42) (3.50) (4.23)
Labour productivity growth
# 0.471 -0.399 -0.00318 -0.0385 0.0242 0.0243 -0.0195 -0.0680
(1.07) (-0.86) (-0.13) (-1.36) (1.04) (1.10) (-0.35) (-1.19)
Unemployment rate
# 0.000914 -0.000478* -0.0000714 -0.00168***
(1.25) (-2.08) (-0.39) (-3.05)
Industrial production growth
# 0.367** 0.0284* -0.00620 0.0211
(2.79) (1.88) (-0.77) (0.86)
Error correction term
‡ -0.0263*** -0.0270*** -0.00519 0.00680
(-3.07) (-3.27) (-0.25) (0.32)
Constant -0.0123*** 0.0125* 0.000604 0.00503 0.0166*** 0.0126** 0.00287 0.00900** 0.0555*** 0.0348***
(-3.10) (1.83) (0.058) (0.57) (3.30) (2.83) (0.52) (2.85) (6.22) (4.54)
No. observations 19 19 19 19 1473 1481 1462 1470 1476 1484
N o .  c o u n t r i e s 1 9 1 91 9 1 9 2 0 2 02 0 2 0 2 0 2 0
  o f  w h i c h  E M U 1 0 1 01 0 1 0 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R-squared 0.0004 0.50 0.60 0.72 0.23 0.23 0.09 0.09 0.37 0.36
Δwage growth, 1984-98 vs. 1999-08
† Δwage growth, panel data wage growth, panel data
 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In columns (5)-(10) a dummy variable to 
capture Greece during 1999-2000 is included (not shown). Columns (5)-(10) include country- and time-specific 
fixed effects (not shown) and the standard errors allow for observations to be correlated within countries. 
#Variables are lagged by one period in columns (1)-(4) and columns (7)-(8).
‡The error correction term is lagged 
by two periods in columns (7)-(8) and by one period in columns (9)-(10). 
†The sample split differs for Greece as 
it only entered the EMU in 2001. 27 
 
Table 3: Did the EMU decrease unemployment? 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EMU (G or P ·G) -0.342 1.046 0.676 0.808 -0.0336 -0.0566
(-0.29) (1.32) (1.07) (1.60) (-0.50) (-1.67)
Lagged unemployment -0.644*** -0.546*** -0.492*** -0.0206*** -0.0416***
(-5.36) (-5.72) (-5.65) (-3.38) (-6.70)
Consumer price inflation 3.236 -3.980 1.092* 0.678
(0.20) (-0.28) (2.03) (1.17)
Labour productivity growth 141.8* 132.2** 2.174** 7.684***
(2.12) (2.72) (2.63) (6.68)
Industrial production growth -94.14*** -2.253***
(-3.85) (-4.53)
GDP growth -44.53 -10.94***
(-1.27) (-8.73)
Constant -1.407 2.854*** 2.296* 0.981 -0.0244 0.565***
(-1.58) (2.93) (1.80) (0.63) (-0.34) (3.16)
No. observations 21 21 21 19 1602 1357
No. countries 21 21 21 19 21 19
  of which EMU 12 12 12 10 12 10
R-squared 0.0045 0.62 0.81 0.79 0.33 0.52
Δunemployment, 1984-98 vs. 1999-08
† Δunemployment, panel data
 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In columns (5)-(6) a dummy variable to 
capture Greece during 1999-2000 is included (not shown). Columns (5)-(6) include country- and time-specific 
fixed effects (not shown) and the standard errors allow for observations to be correlated within countries. 
#Variables are lagged by one period in columns (1)-(4). 
†The sample split differs for Greece as it only entered 
the EMU in 2001. 
 